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Evidence Corner | Prior Statements

Prior statements in Montana: Part II
Prior consistent statements under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B); shouldn’t montana cases be consistent?
By Cynthia Ford
Last month, I wrote about prior inconsistent statements under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A). For that type of evidence, the rule, the
Comment, and the cases are fairly easy. If a witness testifies on
the stand differently from what she said outside the courtroom,
her out-of-court inconsistent statement is admissible for both
impeachment and substantive proof.
This month’s subject, prior consistent statements under
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), is much less straightforward. Whereas
prior inconsistent statements are usually admissible, prior consistent statements are not, and the law about when they might
be is quite confusing. The language of the Montana rule differs
from the federal version and although the Montana Commission
Comment indicates Montana wanted a similar rule with clearer
language, the difference has mattered in some cases. Further,
the myriad Montana Supreme Court cases attempting to apply
this Montana rule are, as we say technically, a mess. It is little
wonder that a judge recently called me for some help on this
issue, and little wonder that I could not provide much. I hope
the research I have done on this issue will help some of you in
current cases, and lead to some changes to make the law in this
area clearer.

Background
Under the common law, and under the Montana and Federal
Rules of Evidence, the general rule about prior consistent statements is exactly the opposite of the rule about prior inconsistent
statements. Prior inconsistent statements under M.R.E. 801(d)
(1)(A) are admissible without restriction, both for impeachment and substantive purposes. (See the previous issue of The
Montana Lawyer for more on this subject, and the difference
between the Montana and federal rules on inconsistent statements). The presumption is that the prior consistent statements
do not come in. “Under common law, a witness could not be
supported by evidence of prior consistent statements because no
amount of repetition makes the story more probable. 4 Wigmore
Evidence, Section 1124 (3rd ed. 1940).” Montana Commission
Comment to M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).
However, even at common law, a witness who was accused of
lying on the stand for a specific reason could have her other consistent statements admitted at trial if they were made before the
alleged reason to lie occurred. The Rules, federal and Montana,
carried this approach forward, and allow prior consistent statements to be admitted in some, but only a few, circumstances.
When they are admissible, the prior consistent statements (like
inconsistent statements) may be considered as substantive as
well as rehabilitative evidence.
The M.R.E. Commission Comment to M.R.E. 801(d)(1) cites
www.montanabar.org

the federal Advisory Committee Note to F.R.E. 801(d)(1):
Subdivision (d)(1) deals with certain prior
statements of the witness who is now testifying
and subject to ideal conditions of oath, crossexamination, and presence of the trier of fact.
The Commission feels that the application of the
conditions at the trial or hearing is sufficient to take
these statements out of the hearsay rule, for requiring their application at the time the statement was
made would have the effect of excluding almost all
prior statements. Therefore, these prior statements
are admitted as substantive evidence. It should also
be noted that the subdivision limits the types of
prior statements placed outside the hearsay rule
to three: This is a compromise between allowing “general use of prior prepared statements
as substantive evidence” which could lead to an
abuse of preferring prepared statements to actual
testimony, and allowing no prior statements to
be admitted, which is not sensible, for “ ... particular circumstances call for a contrary result. The
judgment is one more for experience than logic”.
Advisory Committee’s Note, supra 56 F.R.D. at
295. (Emphasis added).
Even though the Montana Evidence Commission quoted
with approval the federal Advisory Committee Note to 801(d)(1)
(B), the Montana version of the prior consistent statement rule,
801(d)(1)(B) is a bit different from exact wording of the federal
rule. Here are the two current versions, with the language that
differs from the other in bold:
F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B):
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following conditions is not
hearsay:… (B) is consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated
it or acted from a recent improper influence or
motive in so testifying;
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B):
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
… the statement is ...(B) consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an
EVIDENCE, next page

Page 19

EVIDENCE, from previous page

express or implied charge against the declarant of
subsequent fabrication, improper influence or
motive…(Emphasis added).

also indicates that the court should allow rehabilitation by prior consistent statements with any form
of impeachment. On these two points it is apparent
that this case is broader than the clause.

Thus, the Montana Commission clearly intended to restrict
use of prior consistent statements to limited situations where
The Montana Evidence Commission consciously changed the witness has been impeached only on the specific grounds
the language of the F.R.E. version (which was then stylistically (“triggers”) listed in the rule, not just any form of impeachment.
different from the 2011 version set out above) explaining:
It also intended to implant a chronological requirement for the
“Clause 801(d)(1)(B) is not the same as the Federal Rule. It
use of this exception to the general rule prohibiting consistent
provides “ ... consistent with his testimony and his offer to rebut statements as hearsay. Lastly, the Commission intended the
an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication
Montana version of the rule to do the same thing as the federal
or improper influence or motive ... ”. The clause deletes “recent” rule, only better.
and “or” following fabrication so that it reads “ ... consistent
In its seminal case on this issue, the U.S.Supreme Court
with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
took the same view of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B): prior consistent
charge against him of subsequent fabrication, improper influstatements are admitted sparingly, only when specific types of
ence or motive ... ”. The Commission changed the language of
impeachment have been asserted:
the Federal Rule to make the clause clearer.”
The Rules do not accord this weighty, nonhearsay status
The Montana Comment indicates that the language of
to all prior consistent statements. To the contrary, admissibilM.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) conformed to the then-existing state comity under the Rules is confined to those statements offered to
mon law on admission of consistent statements, and mentions
rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence or
explicitly the requirement that the consistent statement must
motive,” the same phrase used by the Advisory Committee in
have been made before the grounds occurred which impeach
its description of the “traditiona[l]” common law of evidence,
the witness. The Comment also notes that the rule expands the
which was the background against which the Rules were drafted.
common law in one way only, that the prior statement now can
See Advisory Committee’s Notes, supra, at 773. Prior consisbe used for substantive evidence in addition to rehabilitation of
tent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of
the witness:
impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has
been discredited...(Emphasis added)
the common law does allow rehabilitation of a
Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150, 157, 115 S.Ct. 696, 701 (1995).
witness who has been impeached on the grounds
(More about Tome below).
mentioned in the clause. …The prior consistent
statement is allowed to rehabilitate the witness
The trigger can occur at any stage in the proceeding,
because it was made prior to the existence of the
impeaching evidence; that is, the consistent statewhenever the opponent intimates that the witness’
ment is made and subsequently the impeaching
testimony is the result of recent fabrication, improper
evidence comes into existence. When a witness
influence, or improper motive
testifies consistently with these prior statements,
it “ ... will effectively explain away the force of the
Federal “trigger” cases
impeaching evidence; because it is thus made to
appear that the statement in the form now uttered
The Federal Advisory Committee which first drafted Rule
was independent of discrediting influence”.
801(d)(1)(B) observed that, under the then-proposed rule, the
…

Existing Montana law is consistent with and
perhaps broader than the clause. The clause does
change Montana law to the extent that it allows
prior consistent statements to be admitted as
substantive evidence. (Citations omitted, emphasis
supplied).
The Commission mentioned three Montana cases (from
1901,1903 and 1975) discussing the common law rule about
prior consistent statements, noting that the first one had not
actually applied the rule and the second had specifically declined
to do so. The third of the cases, though, did allow the prior consistent statements into evidence. The Commission observed:
this case is consistent with the language of the
clause, although it may also be interpreted as expressing concern over which story is the truth and
not when the stories were told. Dicta in that case
Page 20

blame for admission of a witness’ prior consistent statement lies
at the door of the party opposing that witness’ testimony: “if the
opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received
generally.” Advisory Committee’s Note, supra, 56 F.R.D. at 296.
Thus, a party who wishes to limit the impact of a witness’
testimony to the one statement in court should take care to avoid
making any “express or implied charge” that the witness has
recently fabricated his testimony, or “recently” became subject to
an “improper influence or motive.” As the federal cases illustrate, making such a charge “opens the door” to admission of the
prior consistent statements, thus compounding the testimony
of the witness. The door can be opened by argument, as early as
opening statement, as well as by cross examination. Once it is
opened, opposing counsel can bring in the consistent statements
which occurred prior to the fabrication, improper influence or
EVIDENCE, next page

May 2013

improper motive.
Until the door is opened, those statements remain hearsay
and are inadmissible.
In a recent 7th Circuit case, the defendant’s opening statement told the jury that the codefendant had a plea agreement
which rewarded him for testifying for the government. Not only
was the prosecutor allowed to bring in the consistent statement
of the witness made prior to the plea agreement, he was allowed
to do so on direct examination, thus “pulling the teeth” of the
subsequent cross-examination.
Foster clearly implied in his opening statement
that Anderson would lie about Foster’s involvement
in the robbery in order to curry favor with the government. By implying that Anderson’s plea agreement gave him an incentive to lie, Foster opened
the door to the admission of Anderson’s prior
consistent statements on direct examination,
before Foster had an opportunity to challenge
Anderson’s credibility on cross-examination.
See United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 756 (7th
Cir.1991) (holding witness’s prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel
implied during opening statement that witness had
fabricated her testimony); United States v. LeBlanc,
612 F.2d 1012, 1017 (6th Cir.1980) (holding witness’s prior consistent statement admissible where
defense counsel implied in his opening statement
that witness “should not be believed because of
the favorable consideration he received from the
government in his plea bargaining agreement”).
Anderson’s prior consistent statement was not
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and the district
court did not err. (Emphasis added).
U.S. v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 787 (C.A.7
(Ill.),2011).
The Ninth Circuit cases are to the same effect.
In U.S. v. Stuart, for example, the defense lawyer
called a FBI agent to testify about an inconsistent
statement the witness had made in an interview.
The 9th Circuit affirmed the trial judge’s admission of consistent statements made in the same
interview:
The record in this case reveals that, prior to the
agent’s testimony, Stuart had vigorously cross-examined Van de Water regarding his plea agreement
with the Government, thereby calling into question
Van de Water’s motive in testifying. Therefore, the
introduction of prior consistent statements made
prior to the plea agreement was proper. United
States v. Allen, 579 F.2d 531, 532-33 (9th Cir.1978)
(prior consistent statements of a declarant made to
an agent may be elicited from the agent under Rule
801(d)(1)(B) where defendant had sharply attacked
the credibility of the declarant and implied that the
declarant was testifying out of a motive to avoid
criminal prosecution).
www.montanabar.org

U.S. v. Stuart, 718 F.2d 931, 934-35 (9th
Cir.,1983). See also, U.S. v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113 (9th
Cir., 1978).

Montana “trigger” cases
The Montana rule and most of the Montana cases similarly
require the opponent to state or imply that the witness’ testimony
is the result of recent fabrication, motive or influence before the
prior consistent statements can be admitted. However, some of
the older cases seem to have missed this requirement and allowed
prior consistent statements in, just because some form of impeachment had occurred. These cases violate both the letter and
spirit of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), and should be overruled.
The most recent case is State v. McOmber, 340 Mont. 262,
173 P. 3d 690 (2007). McOmber was convicted of solicitation
to issue a bad check. His friend, Bill Peltier, testified at trial for
the prosecution. He said on the stand that McOmber had been
arrested for another charge, and had called Peltier to post bond
for him. When Peltier said he didn’t have enough money in his
account to write a check, McOmber encouraged him to do so
anyway, because McOmber would collect enough from other
people to cover the check in the morning. Those other people
didn’t come through, Peltier’s check bounced, and Peltier was
arrested on a bad check charge. While in jail, Peltier first gave
a written statement and then an oral interview. His bad check
charge was dropped to a misdemeanor, to which he pled guilty,
and McOmber was charged with the felony solicitation.
After Peltier testified against McOmber, the prosecution tried
to introduce both his written statement and the transcript of
his interview. The defense counsel used the old “gilding the lily”
objection, which actually gets to the common law rule that generally prior consistent statements are inadmissible hearsay (which
would be a better phrase for your objection). The trial judge
overruled the objection, citing M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A). On appeal,
the Supreme Court laid out the general requirements for admission of prior consistent statements:
Under the rule, there are four requirements
that must be met for a statement to be admissible as
a prior consistent statement:
“(1) the declarant must testify at trial and (2)
be subject to cross-examination concerning her
statement, and (3) the statements to which the witness testifies must be consistent with the declarant’s
testimony, and (4) the statement must rebut an
express or implied charge of subsequent fabrication, improper influence or motive.” State v.
Teters, 2004 MT 137, ¶ 25, 321 Mont. 379, ¶ 25, 91
P.3d 559, ¶ 25. (Emphasis supplied).
State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, 340 Mont.
262, 266, 173 P.3d 690, 694-95.
The Court found that the defense indeed alleged that Peltier
was fabricating in order to obtain favorable treatment of his
own felony charge, and that the charge was in fact dropped to a
misdemeanor, so that there was a charge of improper influence
EVIDENCE, next page
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substantially similar to her trial testimony. The defense objected
on hearsay grounds, but the trial judge admitted both statements
or motive. Nonetheless, the Court found (harmless) error in the under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). On appeal, the State argued that
admission of the prior statements, on chronological grounds (see the defendant had implied fabrication by the victim, citing the
below), holding that the consistent statement was not “prior” to
defense cross-examination about how many times the victim had
the alleged influence or motive.
met with the prosecuting attorneys and questions pointing out
State v. Teters, 2004 MT 137, 321 Mont. 379, 385-86, 91 P.3d inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. The Supreme Court
559, 564, was a stepfather sexual abuse case. (A lot of the 801(d) held that the cross-examination merely attacked the victim’s
(1)(B) cases, state and federal, arise in this context). The victim
overall credibility, and did not imply any specific motive for
testified, and the prosecution introduced her prior statement to a fabrication. Therefore, the prior consistent statements were not
social worker. The defendant objected, but lost both in trial and admissible:
on appeal:
Here, Mensing only questioned Perry about
In the present case, defense counsel launched a general attack
inconsistencies in her story and implied that her
on J.U.’s credibility by insinuating that she possessed a motive
memory was faulty as a result of drinking alcohol
to fabricate her testimony, and that she had been improperly
and smoking marijuana on the night in question.
influenced by her mother. Although implied, these charges of
He did not question Perry regarding whether she
improper motive and influence were sufficient to satisfy the
had any reason to testify falsely. There was no
fourth requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid.
charge-direct or implied-of a specific motive to fabIn contrast, in State v. Lunstad (1993), the child victim testiricate. Our review of the record does not support
fied about the “private touch” by the defendant. The prosecution
the State’s assertion that Mensing attacked Perry’s
then tried to admit the child’s four prior consistent statements to
credibility in a manner sufficient to allow admisa therapist; the defendant objected on hearsay grounds and was
sion of her prior consistent statements.
sustained. The prosecution then took another tack: when the
defendant testified later, the prosecutor directly asked him on
¶ 17 We conclude that Mensing made no
cross-examination whether he thought that the victim was lying.
express
or implied charge of fabrication, improper
(There were no questions about any specific motive or influinfluence
or motive against Perry during her crossence for the alleged lies). When he said “Yes,” the prosecution
examination
and, as a result, the officers’ testimony
re-offered the prior consistent statements made by the victim to
regarding
her
prior statements was not admissible
her therapist under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The trial court bit and
as
nonhearsay
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid.
admitted the statements. The Supreme Court found this to be
...
Consequently,
we further conclude that the
reversible error:
District
Court
abused
its discretion in admitting
Here, the State itself opened the door by directly asking
the
law
enforcement
officers’
hearsay testimony
Mr. Lunstad if C.H. was lying, and then attempted to bolster
regarding
Perry’s
prior
statements.
C.H.’s credibility by the admission of the very prior consistent
EVIDENCE, from previous page

statements that the district judge had ruled inadmissible
hearsay in the State’s case-in-chief. The State cannot use this
type of cross-examination to get evidence admitted which
it could not get admitted prior to its cross-examination. We
hold that it was an abuse of discretion and reversible error to
allow the rebuttal testimony, in the form of prior consistent
statements, to be presented on these facts.
State v. Lunstad, 259 Mont. 512, 516, 857 P.2d 723, 72526 (1993). [But see, State v. Hart, 303 Mont. 71, 82, 15 P.3d
917, 924 (2000), a non 801(d)(1)(B) case, where the Court
distinguished Lunstad and stated: “We refuse to adopt a
bright-line rule regarding the propriety of questioning
the defendant about the truthfulness of other witnesses....
we commit the decision on whether to allow this type of
questioning in any particular instance to the sound discretion
of the district court.”]

Effect of error in admitting consistent statements
which do not meet the requirements of 801(d)(1)(b)
Montana Approach
State v. Mensing was another sexual intercourse without
consent case, this one decided in 1999. Again, the victim testified at trial and the prosecution tried to introduce two additional
statements she had given to the investigating officers, both
Page 22

State v. Mensing, 1999 MT 303, 297 Mont. 172,
176-77, 991 P.2d 950, 954.
Mensing’s conviction was upheld, however, because the
Court found the error to be harmless. More startling, it indicated that wrongful admission of prior consistent statements would
always be harmless error:
…a defendant is not prejudiced by the introduction of inadmissible hearsay testimony when
the hearsay statements are separately admitted
through the testimony of the declarant or through
other direct evidence. State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162,
¶ 26, 289 Mont. 450, ¶ 26, 962 P.2d 1153, ¶ 26.
Furthermore, where the declarant testifies at
trial and the defendant is given the opportunity
to cross-examine regarding the statements at
issue, the improper admission of the declarant’s
out-of-court statements is considered harmless.
(Emphasis added).
State v. Mensing, 1999 MT 303, 297 Mont. 172,
177, 991 P.2d 950, 954.
(Mensing has been cited only once in Montana, and in a case
where the prior consistent statement was held to be admissible.
EVIDENCE, next page
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However, its language has never been overruled.)

In Veis, cited by Mensing, the Court stated:

where hearsay testimony has been erroneously
admitted, the defendant must have suffered prejudice as a result of the error to be entitled to have his
conviction reversed. See State v. Stuit (1996), 277
Mont. 227, 232, 921 P.2d 866, 869; State v. Riley
(1995), 270 Mont. 436, 440, 893 P.2d 310, 313.
¶ 26 We have held that a defendant is not prejudiced by hearsay testimony when the statements
that form the subject of the inadmissible hearsay
are admitted elsewhere through the direct testimony of the “out-of-court” declarant or by some
other direct evidence. See Stuit, 277 Mont. at 232,
921 P.2d at 869; State v. Graves (1995), 272 Mont.
451, 460, 901 P.2d 549, 555; Riley, 270 Mont. at
440, 893 P.2d at 313. Our holdings reflect the fact
that when a defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine a declarant because he or she is present at
trial and testifies, the dangers that the hearsay rule
seeks to avoid are not present and, therefore, hearsay regarding the declarant’s out-of-court statement
that is admitted during another witness’s testimony
is harmless. See State v. Canon (1984), 212 Mont.
157, 164, 687 P.2d 705, 709 (concluding that the
testimony was not hearsay, but stating that even
if it had been, there would have been no prejudice
because “the defendant had all of the necessary opportunity to protect himself by cross-examination
of [the declarant].”).
(Emphasis added).
…
¶ 28 Here, in the District Court trial both of the
boys testified prior to Dugan-Laemmle’s testimony.
Each of them identified Veis as their abuser. In
addition, S.J. identified the letter and list of names
that he had written during his therapy and described both the directions he had been given by
Dugan-Laemmle when asked to write them and the
content of his writings. He testified that in both the
letter and the list he explicitly identified Veis as his
abuser. Veis had full opportunity to cross-examine
both boys. At no point during his cross-examination of S.J. or B.J. did Veis challenge the boys’
identification of Veis as their abuser. Accordingly,
Dugan-Laemmle’s hearsay testimony about the
boys’ identification of their abuser during therapy
was simply cumulative of the boys’ own testimony
and did not deny Veis the opportunity to confront
his accusers.
State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162, 289 Mont. 450, 457458, 962 P.2d 1153, 1157.
Wow! The language in these two cases, Veis and Mensing,
amounts to a judicial rewrite of Rule 801(d), in effect saying all
www.montanabar.org

prior statements of a witness are admissible, or at least that there
will be no consequence for their admission. This, in turn, directly
contravenes the intent of the Montana Evidence Commission
which drafted the restrictive language of Rule 801(d), as well as
the intent of the Federal Advisory Committee, as expressed in the
Notes to F.R.E. 801(d).

Federal approach
Compare this approach with that of the federal courts. In
Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150, 157, 115 S.Ct. 696, 701 (1995), the
U.S. Supreme Court remanded a father’s conviction for sexual
abuse of his daughter precisely because of the admission of the
victim’s prior consistent statements. (This case is discussed in
more detail in the next section). On remand, the 10th Circuit
held that some of the statements were admissible under Rule
803(4), but that the statements made by the girl to her mother,
her babysitter, and a social worker did not meet the requirements
of 801(d)(1)(B) in view of the Supreme Court decision, nor did
they fulfill any hearsay exception, and were inadmissible. The
court went on to hold that the admission of these statements was
not harmless, and reversed the conviction.

Montana should enforce 801(d)(1)(B)
If the Montana rule is to actually mean what it says, the
Montana Supreme Court should take another look at its enforceability. If a prior consistent statement is not admissible, but
there is no potential reversal if it is admitted, it is a rare advocate
who would back away from using it, and perhaps a rare judge
who would strictly enforce the rule if a possible error is “always
harmless.”

Chronology requirement: Both the montana and
federal versions of 801(d)(1)(b) allude to an additional
timing relationship requirement, once the trigger has
been pulled
The F.R.E. version states: “consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent
improper influence or motive in so testifying;”
The M.R.E. version is: “consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
the declarant of subsequent fabrication, improper influence or
motive…” (Emphasis added).

U.S. Supreme Court
“Required Chronology” case is clear:
The United States Supreme Court took cert in 1995 to resolve
a conflict between the federal circuits on the exact requirements
of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). In Tome v. U.S., the witness was 6 years
old when she testified, very haltingly, about her father’s sexual
acts with her. (Observing her demeanor on the stand, the trial
judge observed “We have a very difficult situation here.”) The
parents were divorced and engaged in a custody battle in tribal
court. The defendant’s theory was that his daughter fabricated
her story in order to be able to remain with her mother at the
EVIDENCE, next page
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end of her summer visit, even though the tribal court order in
place gave the accused father physical custody.
The trial judge admitted six prior statements of the young
victim, made prior to trial to a babysitter, the mother, a social
worker, and three pediatricians. The 10th Circuit affirmed all six
admissions, following the flexible “balancing” approach used in
the 9th Circuit to the “subsequent” language in 801(d)(1)(B).
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, and held that
prior consistent statements are inadmissible unless they predate
the alleged reason to alter the testimony:
The prevailing common-law rule for more than a century
before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was that a prior
consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive was admissible if
the statement had been made before the alleged fabrication,
influence, or motive came into being, but it was inadmissible
if made afterwards. As Justice Story explained: “[W]here the
testimony is assailed as a fabrication of a recent date, ... in order
to repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent declaration of
the party may be admitted.” Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
412, 439, 9 L.Ed. 475 (1836) (emphasis added). See also People v.
Singer, 300 N.Y. 120, 124–125, 89 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1949).
McCormick and Wigmore stated the rule in a more categorical manner: “[T]he applicable principle is that the prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge unless the
consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence or incapacity originated.” E. Cleary, McCormick
on Evidence § 49, p. 105 (2d ed. 1972) (hereafter McCormick).
See also 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1128, p. 268 (J. Chadbourn
rev. 1972) (hereafter Wigmore) (“A consistent statement, at a
time prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias ... will
effectively explain away the force of the impeaching evidence”
(emphasis in original)). The question is whether Rule 801(d)(1)
(B) embodies this temporal requirement. We hold that it does.
Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150, 156, 115 S.Ct. 696, 700 (1995).
(Emphasis added).

Montana “Required Chronology”
cases are not so clear
Although many other states have distinguished or outright
disagreed with Tome in interpreting their own versions of the
hearsay rule, the Montana Supreme Court has cited it with approval on several occasions.
In State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 158, 948 P.2d 186, 197
(1997), where the Supreme Court ultimately held that the disputed evidence was inconsistent with the trial testimony, it first
commented about the requirements for admission of consistent
statements:
Appellant correctly states that in order to introduce a witness’s prior consistent statements, the proponent must first lay
the necessary foundation as outlined in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and
State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont. 512, 517, 857 P.2d 723, 726
(holding that a declarant’s prior consistent out-of-court statements are admissible only when those statements were made
before the alleged fabrication, improper influence, or motive
Page 24

arose). See also,Tome v. United States (1995), 513 U.S. 150, 115
S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574. (Emphasis added)
Just a year later, though, the Court inexplicably dismissed an
argument on appeal based on Tome: “He cites Tome v. United
States (1995), 513 U.S. 150... In Tome, the Court interpreted
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), which is different from Rule 801(d)(1)
(B), M.R.Evid.” State v. Johnson, 288 Mont. 513, 524, 958 P.2d
1182, 1189 (1998). This is an area where Montana trial judges
and lawyers need more consistent guidance from the Montana
Supreme Court.
The existing Montana cases divide into two camps: those
where the witness’ consistent statement was made before, and
those where the consistent statement was made after, the alleged
reason to lie (or at least shade testimony) came into existence.

Cases where the prior statement was admissible
non-hearsay, because it predated the alleged
reason to lie
In State v. Teters (2004), discussed above, the stepdaughter
victim testified at trial about the defendant’s sexual abuse of
her. The trial judge later allowed evidence of her prior consistent statements through the testimony of a representative of the
Utah Dept. of Child and Family Services, who had interviewed
the victim. The Supreme Court held this was proper, because
the defense counsel had suggested in opening statement that
the girl was lying to help her mother in a “messy divorce.” The
interview occurred well before the spouses separated, so there
was no “messy divorce” when the prior statement was made. The
chronology (statement, then messy divorce proceedings, then
testimony consistent with the statement) thus met the requirement that the prior consistent statement occur prior to the alleged motive to fabricate:
In State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont. 512,
516, 857 P.2d 723, 726, we emphasized that prior
consistent statements are admissible only when
a specific motive to fabricate is alleged and the
prior consistent statements were made before the
time the alleged motive to fabricate arose.
¶ 28 Furthermore, the consistent statements
were made prior to the time the alleged motivation
to fabricate arose. See Lunstad, 259 Mont. at 516,
857 P.2d at 726. In his opening statement, defense
counsel implied that J.U. had been subject to the
improper influence of her mother, who was in the
midst of a “messy divorce” from Teters. However,
J.U.’s statements to Burdette occurred prior to the
parties’ separation in April 2001, and well before the commencement of divorce proceedings.
Accordingly, J.U.’s statements were made prior to
the alleged motivation to fabricate arose, and are
admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid.
We therefore hold the District Court did not err
in admitting Burdette’s testimony concerning
J.U.’s prior consistent statements of sexual abuse.
EVIDENCE, next page
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(Emphasis added).

theory to its facts. The Court affirmed admission of the consistent
statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), holding that:
State v. Teters, 2004 MT 137, 321 Mont. 379,
According to Scheffelman, the victim’s prior statements
385-86, 91 P.3d 559, 564.
should not have been admitted because she had a motive to fabricate when they were made. However, according to the testimony,
State v. Sheffelman (1991) is another sexual abuse case. Its
the victim’s motive for fabrication was that she did not want
holding is as messy as its facts. In her opening, the prosecutor
alluded to the girl’s prior consistent and inconsistent statements Scheffelman to return to the family household and continue his
and indicated that the girl told her story to prevent her stepfather pattern of abuse. This reason cannot be considered a motive to
from returning to the home and continuing the molestation. The fabricate. Rather, it is inherently intertwined with the truth or
prosecution was later able to introduce the prior consistent state- falsity of the charge of the crime itself. It may provide the impetus to report the defendant’s abuse, but it does not evidence any
ments into evidence, over the defendant’s objection.
motive to lie or fabricate. Therefore, we hold no error was comThe Supreme Court affirmed the admission of those statemitted in allowing the prior consistent statements into evidence.
ments. First, it observed that both the prosecution and defense
250 Mont. at 341, 820 P.2d at 1297.
openings had discussed possible motives for the girl to falsify
Justice Trieweiler filed a separate opinion in which he contestimony. On direct examination, the prosecution introduced
curred with the holding admitting the prior consistent stateseveral inconsistent statements she had made. The defendant
cross-examined the girl, and intimated that she had been subject ments, but simply said “I do not agree with all that is said in
to improper influence from the prosecutor. The prosecution was the majority’s discussion of prior consistent statements.” (The
then permitted to introduce several witnesses who testified about bulk of his opinion dissented about an issue of expert witness
out of court statements the victim had made to them which were qualifications).
If the girl’s motive was to prevent her stepfather’s return,
consistent with her trial testimony. The Court distinguished bethat
motive existed at the first time she spoke about the abuse,
tween the impeachment of “you have been lying all along” from
and
so
the consistent statements are all subsequent, not prior to,
“you are lying because the prosecutor influenced you”:
the existence of her alleged motive. The only logical way to read
The defendant claims he does not assert a subSheffelman, although the Court did not articulate this specifisequent fabrication on the part of the victim, but
cally, is to parse the language of the rule (“offered to rebut an
that she was fabricating or lying all along. Generally
express or implied charge against the declarant of subsequent
speaking, if this were true, prior consistent statefabrication, improper influence or motive…”) so that the word
ments would not be admitted. However, given the
“subsequent” modifies only “fabrication,” and thus there is no
fact that the defense implied improper influence on
temporal requirement for that prior consistent statements ofthe part of the prosecuting attorney in cross examfered to rebut any implication of improper influence or motive.
ining the victim, we hold that her prior consistent
Although this interpretation is grammatically possible, it does
statements in this case were properly admitted.
not comport either with the common law or the Tome approach.
In Lunstad, the Court discussed but distinguished Sheffelman; its
State v. Scheffelman, 250 Mont. 334, 339, 820
description of Sheffelman is somewhat clearer than the original
P.2d 1293, 1296 (1991).
case itself:
Acknowledging that some jurisdictions (notably Colorado
[In Sheffelman] Court held that a prior consisand New Mexico) have given up the chronological requirement,
tent
statement was allowable if it was made before
and allow all prior statements in, without regard to their timany
motive
to fabricate had arisen. However, if a
ing relative to the alleged motive or influence to fabricate, the
defendant
does
not assert that the victim is subseMontana Supreme Court decided to join the majority of jurisdicquently
fabricating
her story, but claims, as in this
tions which retained the common law approach:
case,
she
was
lying
all
along, prior consistent stateMost jurisdictions still look to the time that the statement was
ments
are
not
admissible.
Scheffelman, 820 P.2d at
made in order to address concerns of relevancy, however. These
1296.
In
Scheffelman,
the
Court
held that, because
jurisdictions hold that in order to be relevant, a prior consistent
the defendant alleged the victim was improperly
statement must be made before the declarant has a motive to fabinfluenced, no error was committed in allowing the
ricate. If a declarant makes consistent statements after the motive
prior consistent statements into evidence under
to fabricate arises, the relevancy of those statements under Rules
Rule 801. Scheffelman, 820 P.2d at 1296 .
402 and 403, M.R.Evid, is lost because they have no bearing upon
truthfulness or veracity. See e.g. United States v. Miller, (9th
State v. Lunstad, 259 Mont. 512, 517, 857 P.2d
Cir.1989), 874 F.2d 1255, 1272...
723, 726 (1993).
We believe that the most logical view is that held by the
Two years later, the Court acknowledged its improvement
Ninth Circuit. As described above, this view requires the prior
of Scheffelman, and reaffirmed its commitment to the
consistent statement to be made before any motive to fabrichronologic requirement:
cate has arisen. This view is most in line with the traditional
common law and with common sense notions of relevancy.
We interpreted Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid., in
(Emphasis added).
Scheffelman and refined that interpretation in State
250 Mont. at 340-314, 820 P.2d at 1297.
The problem with Sheffelman lies in its application of this
EVIDENCE, next page
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v. Lunstad (1993)... . We emphasized in Lunstad
that prior consistent statements are admissible only
when a specific motive to fabricate is alleged and
the prior consistent statements were made before
the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose.
Lunstad, 857 P.2d at 726.
State v. Fina, 273 Mont. 171, 182, 902 P.2d 30,
37 (1995).
The Court observed that, although the defendant wanted
to admit the consistent out-of-court statements of the defense
witnesses:
Fina does not establish that any specific motive to fabricate
was raised at trial regarding any of the witnesses whose statements are at issue here. He also does not establish that any express or implied charge was raised that any or all of the witnesses
were improperly influenced or had improper motives.
273 Mont. at182, 902 P.2d at 37.
Fina did not identify on appeal any impeachment by the
prosecution which would trigger 801(d)(1)(B); indeed, he did
not identify any particular witness or any particular out of court
statement which would qualify for non-hearsay treatment.
Therefore, 801(d)(1)(B) did not apply, and the consistent statements remained inadmissible hearsay.
The Lunstad/Fina gloss on Sheffelman helps, but not enough.
The Montana Supreme Court cited Lunstad in a 1998 case which
confuses the issue even more. State v. Johnson is another sexual
assault case. This time the defendant was not a family member,
and the victim was an adult. She claimed that, instead of giving
her the promised ride home, Johnson drove her to an isolated
trail outside Hamilton and raped her. The defense theory was
that the intercourse was consensual, and that the victim concocted the rape story afterwards to maintain her relationship with her
boyfriend and another man (the Supreme Court described this as
“hiding her promiscuity from others”).
The victim gave a lengthy interview to the police after she
was rescued by passers-by. There were two versions of the typed
transcript, which led to confusion at trial because the defendant
had a version which the victim had annotated in handwriting,
which somehow the prosecution did not have. Johnson’s lawyer
used the annotated version to impeach the victim during her
cross-examination, and may have adduced some of the same
statements during the detective’s cross-examination as well (the
case is not clear on this point). The State then offered the whole
transcript into evidence “under Rule 801(d)(1), M.R.Evid., as
either a prior consistent or prior inconsistent statement.”
State v. Johnson, 288 Mont. 513, 522, 958 P.2d 1182, 1188
(1998). The confusion lay in exact words the victim handwrote
in the transcript: “I kept going back and forth.” The defense
claimed this meant that she was physically going back and forth,
voluntarily participating in the encounter with pleasure; the
victim explained that this phrase described her mental state, alternating between scared and furious, which would be consistent
with her testimony.
The trial judge chose the consistent statement approach, and
admitted the transcript under 801(d)(1)(B). Both sides discussed
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the prior statement in their closings: the prosecutor argued that it
was “not that inconsistent” with her testimony, while the defense
argued that it was very different from what she said on the stand
and supported the defense theory that she had fabricated the
story all along. On appeal, the defendant cited both Tome and
Lundstad. The Court dismissed Tome in a single observation
that the federal version was different from M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)
(which did not refer at all to the Commission’s express desire to
emulate and clarify the federal rule); see above. The Court then
went on to cite with approval the Lunstad principle that if the
defendant alleges the victim has been lying from the start, there
is no “subsequent” fabrication, so consistent out of court statements are not admissible. The Court’s next two paragraphs are
both confused and confusing:
¶ 45 In this case, the prior statement in the
annotated transcription may have had general
impeachment value to the defense, but ... nothing
in it supported Johnson’s theory that the victim
was concocting the rape to hide her promiscuity
from others. The prior statement thus provided no
independent basis for defense counsel to question
the victim about a “motive to lie all along,” but was
relevant only to suggest that the victim’s overall
credibility was suspect because of her various statements concerning the rape.
¶ 46 The annotated statement was initially
brought before the jury by the defense, for purposes
of impeachment. The defense attempted to use the
annotated transcription as a prior inconsistent statement by the victim. Under that argument, the annotated transcription would have had to predate the
motive to lie. But, as the District Court noted, the
victim’s statements in the annotated transcription
proved to be fairly consistent with her trial testimony. A prior consistent statement which predates the
motive to lie is admissible into evidence. Therefore,
we conclude that the State was thereafter entitled
to utilize the statement as a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate the witness, and the annotated
transcription was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)
(B), M.R.Evid.
State v. Johnson, 288 Mont. 513, 524, 958 P.2d
1182, 1189 (1998).
Obviously, the Court made perhaps a typographical error, but
its confusion between the requirements for prior consistent v.
prior inconsistent statements deepens the murk.
In State v. Hibbs (1989), four young girls accused their 58
year old neighbor of forcing them to perform sexual acts on him.
All four of them testified at trial. After they had testified, the
prosecutor was allowed to call two of their mothers and a social
worker, who testified about prior consistent statements made by
the girls. The defendant objected to all the consistent statements
as hearsay, but was overruled. 		
The Supreme Court
affirmed their admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), citing the defense attack on the credibility of the girls, but acknowledging that
EVIDENCE, next page
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it was a general attack that they did not know the difference between fantasy and truth. In opening, defense counsel warned the
jury: “Be sure...the children...know the difference between truth
and fantasy, between the truth and a lie.” In his cross-examinations of them, he continued with this theme: “he questioned the
children repeatedly (original emphasis) over whether they knew
what a lie was and whether they had ever lied.” The Court held:
“In asking such questions, defense counsel placed the credibility
of the child witnesses in issue,” State v. Hibbs, 239 Mont. 308,
313, 780 P.2d 182, 185 (1989), and therefore their prior consistent statements were admissible to rebut the attack on the witnesses’ credibility. There was no analysis at all about the chronological relationship between the alleged fabrication and the out of
court statements, nor any identification of any improper motive
or influence, both of which appear to be necessary under the
plain language of the rule. The lesson from Hibbs seems to be
that if the opponent attacks the credibility of any witness in any
way, all prior consistent statements of that witness made out of
court are admissible. This simply does not comport with either
the plain language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or the Comments of the
Montana Evidence Commission to that rule.

Cases where the prior statement was inadmissible
hearsay because it did not predate the alleged reason
to lie
In State v. McOmber, 340 Mont. 262, 173 P. 3d 690 (2007),
discussed earlier, the defense clearly triggered 801(d)(1)(B) when
it cross-examined witness Bill Peltier about the plea bargain he
received for a related charge, implying he shaded his testimony
against McOmber in return, an “improper motive” or “improper
influence.” After Peltier testified against McOmber, the prosecution offered as exhibits both Peltier’s written statement and the
transcript of his interview, both made while he was in jail. The
defense counsel used the old “gilding the lily” objection, which
actually gets to the common law rule that generally prior consistent statements are not admissible (which would be a better
phrase for your objection). The trial judge overruled the objection, citing M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), and admitted both statements.
The Supreme Court found this was error, on a chronological
ground:
¶ 15 We have previously held that the prior
consistent statement rule “only applies when the
declarant’s in-court testimony has been impeached
by another party’s allegations of subsequent
fabrication, improper influence, or motive.” State
v. Lunstad, 259 Mont. 512, 515, 857 P.2d 723, 725
(1993). In addition, to qualify as a prior consistent statement under M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), the
statement must have been made before the alleged
motive to fabricate arose. Teters, ¶ 27; State v.
Veis, 1998 MT 162, ¶ 24, 289 Mont. 450, ¶ 24, 962
P.2d 1153, ¶ 24 (citing Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150,
167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 705, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995)).
(Emphasis added).

State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, 340 Mont. 262, 267, 173
P.3d 690, 695. The timing of the prior statements and the
motive to lie was critical:
www.montanabar.org

Crucially, as to the requirement that the statements were made prior to the time the alleged
motive to fabricate arose, McOmber claims this
requirement was not met and, therefore, the exhibits’ admission was in error. The State charged
Peltier with the felony count of issuing a bad check
on December 2, 2003, and he was arrested in
February 2004 on that charge. While incarcerated
in the Powell County jail, Peltier made his written
statement on February 18, 2004, and the interview
with Captain George took place the following
day. McOmber maintains that Peltier’s motive
to fabricate existed prior to the time he made his
statements to Captain George—i.e., the motive
arose when Peltier was arrested. We agree with
McOmber’s assertion. Given that Peltier’s prior
consistent statements were made after he had been
charged and jailed on the felony charge, it is clear
that the alleged motive to fabricate arose before he
made those statements.

State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, 340 Mont.
262, 267-68, 173 P.3d 690, 695. The admission of
the prior statements was error.1
State v. Maier was a1999 case, involving attempted homicide.
One of the shooting victims was Robert Bradford. He testified at
trial, identifying Maier as the shooter. The defense cross-examined to the effect that Bradford first found out “around town”
who had been arrested for the shooting, and then went to the
police and told them it was Maier. The prosecutor was allowed
to call the detective who recounted Bradford’s out-of-court statement that Maier was the shooter. The Supreme Court concluded
that this was an inappropriate use of 801(d)(1)(B) because of
the timing of the alleged motive to fabricate and the out of court
statement:
¶ 38 We conclude that Detective Hollis’ testimony concerning what Bradford told him about the
identity of the shooter was not a prior consistent
statement. In State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont.
512, 857 P.2d 723, this Court held that Rule 801(d)
(1)(B) “only applies when the declarant’s in-court
testimony has been impeached by another party’s
allegations of subsequent fabrication, improper
influence, or motive.” Lunstad, 259 Mont. at 515,
857 P.2d at 725. The Lunstad Court further held
that prior consistent statements must be made before a declarant’s alleged motive to fabricate arose.
Lunstad, 259 Mont. at 516, 857 P.2d at 726.
¶ 39 In the present case, Maier’s cross-examination of Bradford clearly suggested that Bradford’s
motive to fabricate arose as soon as he learned of
Maier’s arrest:
Q. So isn’t it true that you didn’t see who was
EVIDENCE, next page
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sitting in there shooting at you...
Q. That you ran around town trying to get the
name of who was sitting in that seat shooting at
you. And once you got the name, because Mr. Maier
had been arrested, you went in to the police and you
told them, Mr. Maier is the one that was shooting at
me? Isn’t that true?
A. No. I seen who it was. I just went around
and tried to find out to verify my mind before I
start accusing someone.
Bradford testified that he thought he had talked
to police about Maier several days after Maier was
arrested. We conclude that Bradford’s statement
was not a prior consistent statement under Rule
801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid., because he made it after
his alleged motive to fabricate arose.
State v. Maier, 1999 MT 51, 293 Mont. 403, 412,
977 P.2d 298, 305. Once again, though, the Court
held that this error was harmless.
Similarly, in State v.Veis, 289 Mont. 450, 962 P.2d 1153
(1998), the defense theory was that the young victims had been
sexually abused but by someone other than Veis. In support of
that theory, the defense introduced a note which one of the boys
had written, indicating that he had been raped by his father (who
was not Veis). The boy’s explanation was that the note was false,
but he had written it to work up his courage to report Veis’ abuse.
The prosecutor then called the boys’ therapist, who recounted
what the boys had said about their abuser during therapy sessions. The Supreme Court held this evidence to be hearsay,
outside the non-hearsay definition of 801(b)(1)(B):
in order for a statement to be admissible as a
prior consistent statement pursuant to Rule 801(d)
(1)(B), M.R.Evid., it must, among other things,
have been made before the declarant had a motive
to fabricate. See Tome v. United States (1995), 513
U.S. 150, 167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 705, 130 L.Ed.2d 574,
588; State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont. 512, 517,
857 P.2d 723, 726. Here, based on Veis’s theory of
defense, S.J.’s motive to fabricate his accusations
about Veis existed prior to the time that he revealed
during therapy to Dugan-Laemmle that Veis was
his abuser. Accordingly, testimony from DuganLaemmle regarding who S.J. identified during the
exercises constitutes hearsay that is not admissible
as a prior consistent statement.
State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162, 289 Mont. 450, 962
P.2d 1153, 1156-57. (However, here again the Court
went on to hold that the error in admitting the
hearsay testimony was harmless; see above).
State v. Lunstad was actually decided on “trigger” grounds,
the Supreme Court holding that the prosecutor can’t create the
impeachment of its own witness on cross-examination of the
defense witnesses, as a pretext to admit prior consistent statements. (See above). However, the Court went on to discuss the

chronology requirements, and held that the statement did not
qualify for admission under 801(d)(1)(B) anyway:
[W]e also hold that the statements of C.H. were
not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid.,
because such statements were not made prior to the
time C.H.’s alleged motive to fabricate arose. In this
case, Mr. Lunstad claimed that C.H. threatened to
tell her father about the touch if Mr. Lunstad would
not give her a piggy back ride. The only possible
motive to fabricate suggested by Mr. Lunstad was
the fact that C.H. was angered at him for refusing
her the piggy back ride. Therefore, any “motive”
arose on November 4, 1991, the day C.H. allegedly
made that statement to Mr. Lunstad. Any statements C.H. made after that date, including statements to her father (November 4, 1991), the police
officer (November 5 and 6, 1991), and her counselor (January, 1992), could not be prior consistent
statements, because they were made subsequent to
the time C.H.’s alleged motive to fabricate arose.
Therefore, C.H.’s statements were not admissible as
prior consistent statements as contemplated by Rule
801(d)(1)(B)...
259 Mont. 512, 516-17, 857 P.2d 723, 726 (1993).

Conclusion
It is time to clean up this troublesome area of Montana evidence law. The easiest way to do that is to change the language of
the rule itself so that it conforms exactly with the current version of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The recent stylistic amendments to
the F.R.E. substantially improved 801(d)(1)(B) by repeating the
temporal requirement for both types of impeachment: “offered
to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or
motive in so testifying.” This is the best way to accomplish the
original intent of the Montana Commission to retain the common law disfavor of out-of-court consistent statements, while
allowing those few which actually counter specific accusations of
improper influence on a witness’ testimony.
When the change is made, the Montana Commission
Comment to the new version of the rule can reiterate the general
rule (that prior consistent statements are inadmissible hearsay)
and clarify the specific requirements for the few exceptions to
that rule. At the same time, the Montana Supreme Court should
acknowledge and resolve its prior inconsistent applications of
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), so that both trial judges and trial lawyers
clearly understand when a statement qualifies for admission
under the rule. The Court should also clarify the divergence in
its opinions, some of which seem to state categorically that error
in admitting prior consistent statements which do not qualify for
the non-hearsay definition is always harmless and not a ground
for reversal. (On the other hand, the Court could choose to affirm its occasional statement that all prior consistent statements
are admissible, as a few other states have done, which would be
another way to solve the problem. If the Court chooses this approach, the M.R.E. should be amended accordingly, so that the
rule and the case law are consistent).
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